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|    | Page 1                         |
| 1  | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT |
| 2  | SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  |
| 3  | CASE NO. 08-13555-scc          |
| 4  | x                              |
| 5  | In the Matter of:              |
| 6  |                                |
| 7  | LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., |
| 8  |                                |
| 9  | Debtor.                        |
| 10 | x                              |
| 11 | U.S. Bankruptcy Court          |
| 12 | One Bowling Green              |
| 13 | New York, New York             |
| 14 |                                |
| 15 | March 24, 2017                 |
| 16 | 10:03 AM                       |
| 17 |                                |
| 18 | BEFORE:                        |
| 19 | HON. SHELLEY C. CHAPMAN        |
| 20 | U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE          |
| 21 |                                |
| 22 |                                |
| 23 |                                |
| 24 |                                |
| 25 | ECRO - KAREN                   |

Page 2 HEARING RE: Doc #53107 Plan Administrators Five Hundred Nineteenth Omnibus Objection to Claims (No Liability Claims) Transcribed by: Sheila Orms and Dawn South

|    | Page 3                              |
|----|-------------------------------------|
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| 9  | RICHARD L. LEVINE, ESQ.             |
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|    | Page 4   |
| 1  | PROCEEDINGS  |
| 2  | THE COURT: Please have a seat.                               |
| 3  | How is everyone?   |
| 4  | ALL: Very good, Your Honor.                                  |
| 5  | THE COURT: Okay. Who am I going to hear from?                |
| 6  | MR. LEVINE: Thank you, Your Honor, Richard Levine            |
| 7  | from Weil Gotshal for LBHI as plan administrator.            |
| 8  | THE COURT: Okay.   |
| 9  | MR. LEVINE: Your Honor                                       |
| 10 | THE COURT: You know, I'll say my usual, I've read            |
| 11 | the papers, but in light of the degree of complexity for the |
| 12 | although you say it's not complex, but in light of the       |
| 13 | sheer volume of the different arguments, I'm happy to let    |
| 14 | you make whatever presentation you like and the same goes    |
| 15 | for the Maverick parties.                                    |
| 16 | MR. LEVINE: Thank you, Your Honor.                           |
| 17 | So, as you know, we believe that if we are right             |
| 18 | about the application of Section 562, then our motion should |
| 19 | be granted in its entirety so that will be my focus. But     |
| 20 | I'd like to start, Your Honor, with the Maverick LBIE        |
| 21 | settlement.  |
| 22 | The first thing I'd like to read from is                     |
| 23 | THE COURT: Can I ask you one                                 |
| 24 | MR. LEVINE: Sure.  |
| 25 | THE COURT: overarching background question.                  |

Pg 5 of 78 Page 5 1 MR. LEVINE: Sure. 2 THE COURT: So this is all came in the first round 3 incident to the estimation motion. 4 MR. LEVINE: That's right. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So in terms of, you know, given 6 that we're at an advanced point in the case, and this is not 7 dispositive in any way, it's just information for me, are 8 there other similar claims structurally similar claims that 9 have been allowed or disallowed either with respect to an 10 LBHI guarantee of a levy obligation or LBIE obligation or an 11 LBHI guarantee of an LBI obligation? And if you don't know 12 the answer that's fine, as a legal matter it's neither here 13 nor there, it's just information. MR. LEVINE: I'll defer to Mr. Fail on that. 14 15 it's my understanding that no, that there were two of these 16 "Libby" guarantee claims, SRM, which we argued to Your Honor 17 last summer and then mediated and then this one, where there 18 were among the few Libby guaranteed claims that were 19 withdrawn from the estimation objection. 20 Most of the Libby guarantee claims were resolved with the estimation objection and you estimated at zero 21 22 because Libby was being a hundred percent payout. 23 were only a handful --24 THE COURT: Payor, you said, payor.

MR. LEVINE: Right, so Libby was paying a hundred

Page 6 1 percent on claims. So it was only a few quarantee claims 2 against LBHI that had settled with Libby before they knew 3 that Libby was going to be a hundred percent payor who 4 objected to the estimation motion. 5 The estimation motion was withdrawn as to those 6 claims because we wanted to get rid of the vast majority 7 where there was no objection, so there was only a handful 8 that survived. And as far as I know, the only one outstanding is 10 SRM and Maverick. SRM is a little bit more complicated 11 because it's governed by UK law, remember we don't that 12 makes a difference --13 THE COURT: I remember, right. MR. LEVINE: -- but it does, it did require both 14 15 sides to be in those horrible English expert law 16 declarations --17 THE COURT: I wouldn't agree with the 18 characterization as horrible, but. 19 MR. LEVINE: Well, they're not written in American 20 English for sure. 21 THE COURT: No comment. 22 MR. LEVINE: Garrett, do you want to add anything 23 to add? 24 MR. FAIL: Yeah, thank you, Your Honor, Garrett 25 Fail.

Pq 7 of 78 Page 7 1 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Fail. 2 MR. FAIL: Your Honor, is correct, there are a 3 number of claims that are still outstanding on -- of Libby guarantees, guarantees by LBHI of Libby primary obligations 4 5 that are subject to a motion to estimate clams. There's 6 essentially two parties that are still outstanding with 7 those, the number of claims that they have acquired, but 8 there's only two parties there. 9 These -- the two that Mr. Levine referenced SRM 10 and Maverick are the only two in the claims objection where 11 LBHI filed an objection because the parties are asking for 12 more than they -- they're looking for no more than --13 THE COURT: The notion on that are the primary obligation at Libby. 14 MR. FAIL: Exactly. And I'm not aware of any L 15 16 claims against LBHI where the primary obligation was LBIE 17 that have been allowed by LBHI. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 18 MR. LEVINE: So what I was going to -- since our 19 20 focus is on 562 --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. LEVINE: -- and I'll get to the legal issues there in a few minutes. I thought what I'd like to do is 23

start with the key elements, which we think allow us to win

if 562 applies.

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Page 8 1 The first is a statement in Maverick's objection 2 to the estimation motion which I don't think, you know, by 3 any means they're walking away from. Your Honor doesn't need to read along with me, but if you want to --4 THE COURT: I have it. I have tab 4. 5 6 MR. LEVINE: Tab 4. 7 THE COURT: Tab 4, yes. MR. LEVINE: Page 11, paragraph 22, and I'm 8 reading the second half of the paragraph about five lines up 9 10 from the bottom. 11 And this is their statement, and again I don't 12 think it's --13 THE COURT: Hold on, tab 4 -- sorry. MR. LEVINE: No problem, tab 4, page 11. 14 15 THE COURT: Page 11, yes. 16 MR. LEVINE: Paragraph 22. 17 THE COURT: The Ivanho rule. 18 MR. LEVINE: On paragraph 23, sorry, next paragraph, I can't read my numbers. So if you go about 19 20 halfway or three quarters of the way down that paragraph, 21 the last sentence begins towards the right-hand column "in 22 light of the cancellation." 23 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LEVINE: So this is their statement "In light 24 25 of the cancellation of indebtedness that would otherwise

Pg 9 of 78 Page 9 1 have been owed to Libby, Maverick concedes that it already 2 has effectively received approximately 101.9 million in 3 value from Libby, in connection with the Libby settlement agreement, reflecting an offset of the approximate value of 4 5 the securities and cash that Libby may have been obligated 6 to return to Maverick under English law." 7 So that's our first kind of point, which is that if we're right, that the settlement, and it wasn't exactly 8 9 the settlement but for purpose of the estimation motion, 10 we're using the date and the valuation that they assert, 11 they got the value of their cash and securities as of the 12 settlement date under the settlement. 13 So that's a valuation date, they got what they're entitled to. As we understand their argument, they say, no, 14 15 you use the petition date. 16 THE COURT: They say you use the petition date --17 MR. LEVINE: Right. 18 THE COURT: -- for the purpose of the guarantee. MR. LEVINE: Of valuing, right, of valuing the 19 20 claim. 21 THE COURT: For the purpose of asserting a claim 22 on the guarantee.

that I wanted to bring out is actually in the settlement

agreement itself, so that is behind tab 4, now we're going

MR. LEVINE: That's right. Then the second thing

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Page 10 1 to tab E behind tab 4, which is the Libby settlement --2 settlement between Libby and Maverick. THE COURT: Yes. 3 4 MR. LEVINE: And there I'd like you to turn to 5 page 4 --6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. LEVINE: -- of the settlement. And it's 8 actually part of -- it's 2.1.A, and this is where it 9 provides for termination, the relevant agreements and 10 they're actually in Schedule 2 to the settlement, and they 11 list all the agreements at issue, the prime brokerage 12 agreements, the marginal lending agreements, and the global 13 mass of secured lender agreements, so they're all listed in 14 Schedule 2 and then defined as the relevant agreements. 15 The relevant agreements and all transactions 16 thereunder, to the extent that they have not previously been 17 terminated are terminated as between Libby and each Maverick 18 entity. 19 And I will tell Your Honor that we saw in 20 discovery any documents suggesting an earlier termination, 21 and you'll remember they actually served the notice of 22 termination, but Maverick was like most Libby claimants, they didn't serve a notice of termination, so there was no 23 24 prior termination. 25 And I don't understand them to be arguing there

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1 was a prior termination.

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THE COURT: No, I think in this point their argument is that essentially it doesn't matter because the words say that they're terminated as between LBIE and each Maverick entity and therefore that does not affect the obligations of LBHI and therefore, it does not implicate or mean that 562(a) is controlling.

MR. LEVINE: Right and --

THE COURT: And in response to this, you say, well, look all the obligations --

MR. LEVINE: I can sit down.

THE COURT: All the obligations are terminated, so the fact that these words limit it to LBIE, is neither here nor there.

MR. LEVINE: Right. I mean, that's exactly right, it's really those three arguments you were just hinting at that LBHI was not a broker dealer. LBHI could not form the prime brokerage functions, in fact, in the prime brokerage agreement it expressly provides that a prime brokerage account, the opening words are "a prime brokerage account open pursuant to this agreement will be opened at Lehman Brothers, Inc."

And so clearly Lehman Brothers, Inc. was the prime broker that, in fact, it was Libby but it had to be either LBI or Libby --

Page 12 1 THE COURT: Sure. 2 MR. LEVINE: -- because LBHI was not a broker or could not trade for customers, could not custody --3 THE COURT: Could not custody --4 5 MR. LEVINE: -- security or cash. So that in 6 terms of the obligations on the Lehman side on the -- under 7 the prime brokerage agreements, it was terminated as to 8 Libby, there was nothing left for LBHI to do. LBHI was 9 technically a party and benefitted from things like 10 exculpation provisions, but it didn't have any obligations 11 because it couldn't interact with customers. 12 Secondly obviously to the extent that their claims 13 are guarantee claims, and under the proof of claim, and 14 we'll look at that in a moment, I'm not sure you're going to 15 pull one out, all the claims are guarantee claims. 16 THE COURT: They're guarantee claims. 17 MR. LEVINE: So if they're guarantee claims --18 THE COURT: Right. MR. LEVINE: -- and the primary claims are against 19 20 Libby and it's been terminated as to Libby, and the only 21 question is whether Libby owes them something as to which 22 we're guarantor. Well, I don't think it matters whether it was terminated as to LBHI when, to the extent their claims 23 24 are a guaranteed claim. 25 THE COURT: And I think finally the argument would

be that if, in fact, it was not terminated as to LBHI, so that there were still somehow leaning obligations of LBHI after the Libby/Maverick settlement, then it was an executory contract and it was rejected pursuant to the plan, and that was just about the same date as the settlement, the effective date of the plan, so it was rejected and 562 would still apply.

So that's our response to the argument that it wasn't terminated as to LBHI. So if we are right that Section 562 controls, then we think there's no room to argument, no room to argue, other than as of that date, the contracts were terminated, the security contracts, the master agreements were terminated and they got full value.

Now, as I understand Maverick's main theory it's very different. The main theory is that the value of their long positions, and they say you don't take into account the short positions, the offsetting short positions, you just look at their long positions, to decrease from the petition date which is they say when you value it, 562 doesn't apply, to the settlement date by 16.2 million. And that they're entitled to that diminution in value from petition date to settlement date because all they were able to get from Libby is the value at the settlement date, and not the value at the petition date.

Of course, we think well, it doesn't matter what

Page 14 1 the value is of the petition date, but that's their argument 2 as I understand it. THE COURT: Well, in support of that argument, 3 4 they say, for example, if for some reason, their claim 5 against LBHI would have had to have been valued prior to the 6 settlement date, you would be stuck with valuation as of the 7 petition date. MR. LEVINE: Well, I -- that may have been true, 8 9 but the -- once they terminated their contracts, 562 kicks 10 in. I mean, 562 --11 THE COURT: 562 kicks in not only with respect to 12 the termination of the prime brokerage agreement, but also 13 with respect to the guarantee agreement. 14 MR. LEVINE: Right, for multiple reasons. Number 15 one, we think the guarantee agreement under the definition 16 in the Code in Section 741 --17 THE COURT: Is the securities --18 MR. LEVINE: -- is the securities contract, right, and to the extent the prime brokerage agreement is the 19 20 master netting agreement, then the guarantee of the master 21 netting agreement is also a securities contract. 22 The -- I lost my train of thought, I'm sorry. 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry, my fault. 24 MR. LEVINE: So, you know, we think 562 applies,

but so to get these diminution damages, reduction in value,

and we're accepting their numbers for the motion to dismiss hearing, we're not agreeing with them, we're just accepting them for purposes of -- for example, they value -- their settlement they value is supposedly as of February 13th, 2012. Because that's, according to their affidavit, basically when the business deal was done.

Now, my guess is, is that the reason they're using that day, so the actual settlement date of March 30th, 2012 is because it moved against them, but I don't know that, and we're not challenging that --

THE COURT: We're not going there at a sufficiency hearing.

MR. LEVINE: At a sufficiency hearing.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LEVINE: We're accepting their number. So -but to get those diminution damages, that 16.2 million they
need to establish 562 doesn't apply, they need to convince
Your Honor that your rulings in Stonehill, Newport, and
Providence and the decision of MF Global on exculpation
provisions precluding diminution damages doesn't apply here,
they're wrong.

THE COURT: And just to stop in the decision tree, even if 562 were held not to apply, you say the exculpation would kick in and would knock out the liability of LBHI on the guarantee nonetheless, correct?

Pq 16 of 78 Page 16 1 MR. LEVINE: On the diminution damages. 2 THE COURT: The diminution damages. 3 MR. LEVINE: They make an assertion that as of the petition date for five of the six funds, you know, five 4 5 funds they chose, so we know what the sixth one would have 6 done to the number, the net amount, and this is on a net 7 basis owed by Libby to Maverick was 4.3, 4.3 million. 8 So we would say that if they're right that 562 9 doesn't apply or worst cast is a 4.3 million --10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. LEVINE: -- then we'd say, once we take into 12 account that sixth fund, it's likely -- well, we know it's 13 going to be less than 4.3, whether it's going to be any 14 positive amount, I mean, I actually know the number, but it 15 was provided in mediation so I can't say it unless counsel 16 agrees, but in the public record, we know that for five of 17 the six funds all that Libby owed Maverick as of the 18 petition date was 4.3 million on a net basis. 19 And as you know, Your Honor, we think this notion 20 that our guarantee was only of long positions and not net, 21 makes no sense. I mean, the function of a guarantee 22 obviously is to make sure that the primary obligor makes the 23 claimant whole. Right. 24 If all Libby owed to Maverick was 4.3 million

because Maverick owed Libby this much and Libby owed it that

much, it seems crazy to say that we have to pay them this windfall that we don't get to take into -- well, we're guaranteeing more the net amount, that they get to claim and get this windfall.

So we think that doesn't make sense. So we think that to get the 16.2 diminution damages, two of the three arguments are is that 562 doesn't apply, we think they lose. The exculpation provisions don't preclude the diminution damages, and we think they lose the law of the case, and at global. And then there's this issue of they only look at their long positions, and I think that's contrary to the nature of a guarantee. We think that's contrary to the nature of the parties agreements.

Now, we made a mistake in our opening brief, we cited to Your Honor the netting provision in the prime brokerage agreement, which provide for netting. And they correctly pointed out in their opposition that that only applied if Maverick was in default.

But there's, you know, sometimes it's lucky to be on the side of a good contract. Paragraph 32 of the prime brokerage agreement, Your Honor --

THE COURT: What tab am I in?

MR. LEVINE: Okay. You are in tab 4B. Your Honor,
I actually have some excerpts printed out, would you --

THE COURT: I can -- it's easier for me to just

|    | Page 18  |
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| 1  | use my little tabs here. So I'm with you.                  |
| 2  | MR. LEVINE: 4B, and if you go to the prime                 |
| 3  | brokerage agreement  |
| 4  | THE COURT: So this is                                      |
| 5  | MR. LEVINE: 4B.  |
| 6  | THE COURT: LBI, prime brokerage agreement.                 |
| 7  | MR. LEVINE: Right, the only prime brokerage                |
| 8  | agreement with LBI.  |
| 9  | THE COURT: Well, it says LBI.                              |
| 10 | MR. LEVINE: Yeah, it's with LBI, but this is the           |
| 11 | one that governed the relationship, there was no separate  |
| 12 | one with LBIE.   |
| 13 | THE COURT: Okay. You folks agree with that?                |
| 14 | MR. BELL: Correct, we do, Your Honor.                      |
| 15 | THE COURT: Okay. So I'm in tab 4B, and what                |
| 16 | page?  |
| 17 | MR. LEVINE: And if you go to paragraph 32 so               |
| 18 | we're towards the end.                                     |
| 19 | THE COURT: Numbered paragraph 32.                          |
| 20 | MR. LEVINE: On page 9.                                     |
| 21 | THE COURT: Yes, cumulative rights entire                   |
| 22 | agreement.   |
| 23 | MR. LEVINE: Right. If you go to the second                 |
| 24 | sentence, it's about four lines down in towards the right- |
| 25 | hand margin, "to the extent that the provisions of any     |

- contracts you have with any Lehman Brothers entity, whether heretofore or hereafter entered into are inconsistent whether the inconsistency be within the contracts or a single contract, the conflict shall be resolved in favor of the provision which affords Lehman Brothers with the maximum rights, remedies, benefits or protections."
- So to the extent that the provisions of a contract, a prior contract heretofore entered into are inconsistent with this, Lehman gets the best provision.
- THE COURT: Okay. And how does that help with respect to the netting provision?
- MR. LEVINE: Because if you go to our tab 3, which is our reply brief, attached to our reply brief was the prior prime brokerage agreement, it's Exhibit 1, it's in terms of the ECF filings, page 27 of 80. Lehman Brothers International Europe LBIE National Prime Brokerage Agreement. At tab 3, page 27 of 80.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEVINE: Okay. So if we go to page -- well, I'm sure there's a page number, it's page 42 of 80, I'm looking at Section 12, termination.

22 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEVINE: "Events of default," of course we have to figure out what an event of default is, "the occurrence of the following events with respect to a party

constitutes an event of default in relation to that party,"
the defaulting party, the other party being the nondefaulting party.

And then we turn to the next page, 12.1D provides

"an active insolvency occurs with respect to the party,

except in the case of an active insolvency which is the

presentation of a petition for winding up or any analogous

proceeding or the appointment of a liquidator or analogous

officer of the defaulting party, in which case, no such

notice will be required, the non-defaulting party serves the

default notice."

Well, from our perspective it's clear that Libby's appointment of an administrator was covered by D, no notice was required, so there was an event of default, it makes sense Libby filed, sought administration was an event of default.

You go to the next section, Section 13, close-out on the occurrence of an event of default the following shall immediately occur, Part C provides that the non-defaulting party, Maverick, had to calculate the amounts, and then Section D on page 44 of 80 makes clear that there's automatic net.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVINE: So that under the prime brokerage agreement in effect, there was a provision which said prior

agreements they're better for Lehman control, this prior agreement makes clear that there's automatic netting in the event of an event of default.

So we think that makes clear that they're netting that.

THE COURT: So just to encapsulate that, you're saying that notwithstanding that they were right with respect to, I'll call it the LBI PB agreement that under the LBI PB agreement, you have to revert to this constellation of provisions in the previous PB agreement, which was, in fact, with LBIE, and that gave you the advantage of netting notwithstanding the fact that your status as a non-defaulting party.

MR. LEVINE: Right, correct. And, you know, frankly I think that's kind of standard and it's kind of surprising to me that the LBI prime brokerage agreement didn't provide for automatic netting. I think this is kind of typical, you know, if things end, you figure out who owes what to what, whom to whom, and you net.

So that we think that that's very important. And maybe it's time to look at the proofs of claim.

THE COURT: Okay. That's tab 5.

MR. LEVINE: That's tab 5. As far as I know, they're all the same except for which Maverick fund it is, the amount claimed, and which guarantee they rely on.

So the language we're going to look at as far as I know, and I checked very carefully is the same -- each of the six proofs of claim. The difference on the guarantees are three of them rely on the corporate resolution, and three of them rely on the 2002 direct guarantee by LBHI.

Now, in fact, that 2002 direct guarantee was replaced by a later guarantee, there was a direct guarantee and the one that we think governs here even though it's not mentioned in the proofs of claim, is a direct guarantee, we're not contesting the application of that direct guarantee, we clearly don't accept the fact that the corporation resolution is enforceable, we don't accept the fact that the S&P letter is enforceable, but we think none of that matters for today because there's a direct guarantee which we acknowledge is enforceable.

So anyway, so I'm just looking at the very first one behind tab 5 which is the one from Maverick Wong and Hanst (ph) Fund Limited. And of course, on the first page, on the form page, they check this box if all or part of your claim is based on the guarantee. And then if we actually look at the text paragraph 1 just recites the filing. The second paragraph 1 provides "this proof of claim is filed in debtor's bankruptcy case by Maverick, Wong and Hanst Unlimited. Maverick has a claim, the claim against the debtor on account of the debtor's full guarantee pursuant,"

and they refer to the corporate resolution, "of the payment of all liabilities, obligations and commitments of Libby."

So clearly that paragraph is only talking about the guarantee. If we go to paragraph 2, again recites the three agreements, the prime brokerage agreement, the marginal lending agreement, and the global mass of securities lending agreement, and then at the very bottom, the last three words on that page it continues, "The Lehman entities agree to provide certain prime brokerage services to Maverick," and then it defines the different agreements as the prime brokerage documents, and that's important, prime brokerage documents, "under the terms of the prime brokerage documents, Libby has a lien and first priority security interest in certain assets held or controlled by Libby."

Okay. Well, that certainly sounds like a right to net, if you have a lien and first priority security interest on the assets. And it continues in that same vein, "Such assets are held as collateral by Libby as Asian and Bayleaf (ph) or itself and all other affiliates of Libby, in connection with Maverick's obligations under the prime brokerage documents."

Again it sounds like they're admitting that we get to net. Then importantly, the last sentence of paragraph 2 reads, "As of the petition date, the Lehman entities have

Page 24 custody of Maverick's assets pursuant to the prime brokerage documents, in the amount of 1.286 million, "that's aggregates across the six claims of 187 million. "This proof of claim constitutes a demand for payment under the guarantee." Then when describing the claim in paragraph 3, "Maverick hereby asserts the claim, the initial amount of that 1.3 million less any amounts owed by Maverick, in connection with the prime brokerage documents." Okay. Now, in their opposition, Maverick argues well, that's not netting, well, you know, sounds to me like netting. And they drop a footnote, which also sounds like netting. THE COURT: Footnote 3. MR. LEVINE: Footnote 3. "For the avoidance of doubt, the initial claim amount is a gross claim and does not take into account any amounts or obligations that Maverick may owe to the Lehman entities under the terms of the prime brokerage documents." THE COURT: Well, that is a -- that language is to protect them from an accusation that they overstated the claim. MR. LEVINE: Right, right, but it's certainly consistent --

THE COURT: No, I understand.

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Page 25 1 MR. LEVINE: -- to their understanding that they 2 only got a net claim. 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. LEVINE: Then they say, "the initial claim 5 amount may change depending on the current value of the 6 assets in custody until such time as Maverick exercises any 7 remedies it may have to liquidate the claim." Well, it's 8 claim. 9 Now, we don't agree with that, we think that 10 either it's the petition date under 502 or the determination 11 or rejection date under 562, but that was their claim, 12 that's fine. 13 Then we go with the additional (indiscernible), because now remember they're asserting they have direct 14 15 claims under the PB agreements, and --16 THE COURT: But they're seeking to amend to assert 17 them, they don't have direct claims under the filed 18 documents, right? 19 MR. LEVINE: Well, as I understand it, they argue 20 that those direct claims are embedded in here. 21 THE COURT: In here? 22 MR. LEVINE: Yes. They have suggested that if 23 they're wrong about that, they'd like to amend, but they don't admit that they need to amend, as I understand their 24 25 position.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I can ask them about that.

MR. LEVINE: The -- I'm reading just now from paragraph -- from footnote 13 of their opposition, "As noted in footnote 3 of the estimation objection, Maverick's claim also asserted and reserve rights with respect to various other entitlements, such as interest, legal fees and other damages, including damages for loss investment opportunities and other items."

Now, we agree that they (indiscernible) mention interest and fees, but we think it's completely inaccurate to say that the Maverick claims also asserted and reserved rights with respect to other entitlements including damages, including damages for investment opportunities and other items. We just don't think they're here.

So we think that to the extent they think they've already asserted them, that's just wrong, and to the extent that they want to assert them, they have to move to amend the proof of claim, and of course we would argue it's much, much too late for that.

THE COURT: Could you address -- there seems to be an argument that somehow this is not capable of being resolved in a sufficiency hearing basis.

MR. LEVINE: Well, we think that's just wrong because there are no disputes. If 562 applies, we think the

-- well, we think that the fact -- our 562 argument relies entirely on legal disputes, that the facts underlying those arguments are not in dispute, that the settlement agreement with Libby and Maverick was where all the prime brokerage documents were terminated, there was no prior termination.

They admit that they got the value of their assets, their cash and securities as of around that date. So those are the only factual issues, we're not disputing the money and I don't think they're disputing the termination.

All they're raising is legal arguments, 562

doesn't apply because the prime brokerage documents are not securities contracts and are not master netting agreements. 
And the guarantee is not a security to the contract or master netting agreements, we think those are issues of law which Your Honor can resolve.

They argue that the prime brokerage documents were only terminated as to Libby, not as to LBHI. Again, we think there's no dispute the language of the settlement agreement, the question is what is the legal impact of the termination. Was there anything against LBHI that could have survived and if there was, wasn't -- didn't that mean that it was an executory contract which was rejected on the date of the effectiveness of the plan.

So we think that clearly under the 562 argument,

it clearly can be resolved because the facts aren't that we rely on are not in dispute, or we're not disputing them at least for purposes of this hearing, and they're just legal issues.

There's also the question of netting. We think that -- or their right to diminution damages, we think that clearly is another legal issue. The language of the prime brokerage documents and the exculpatory language, we think as a matter of law, as Your Honor has held in three different cases and consistent with MF Global precludes diminution damages.

So that we think that Your Honor -- so even if
Your Honor rejects the 562(a) argument, you certainly can
rule as a matter of law that there are no diminution
damages, which would then just leave a question of whether
they're entitled to the 4.3 million net amount owed to them
as of the petition date or some greater or lesser amount I
guess.

But it seems to me, you know, let me -- because as you know, I have never gotten over show and tell, I can't leave without a handout, so I'd like to hand up one and counsel and approach the bench.

THE COURT: And then I'll ask you to wrap up.

MR. LEVINE: Okay.

THE COURT: This is just a demonstrative, right?

MR. LEVINE: This is just a demonstrative. These are numbers. So -- okay. So the top of this is supposed to be our summary of the proofs of claim.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. LEVINE: And as we see it, it's purely a guarantee claim in which they seek 187.3 million in the aggregate, but expresses, when we look at the sample group of claim, expressly minus any amounts owed by Maverick back to Libby, and they think fees and expenses which are unliquidated and interest which is unliquidated, and we don't think they're entitled to those either for the normal reasons, and then no other claims asserted.

Then in their current theory which comes from their objection to the estimation motion, and their response to our objection to their claim, there are guarantee claim components, in which they assert that not 187.3 million, but the value of their long positions, just their long positions without netting was 118.1 at the petition date, that they received 101.9 million in value as of the settlement date, and therefore, that difference is the 16.2 they're asking for we say that since you value it under 562 with the settlement date, there's nothing that's owed to them.

Fees and expenses and interest are still unliquidated. In terms of the second page, there are other claims, they're not saying they have asserted, they want to

Pq 30 of 78 Page 30 amend to assert direct claims under the prime brokerage Those do not seek any incremental damages, so we understand it, it's still the 16.2 as opposed to the 187.3 on the proofs of claim. Now, we obviously have various responses that are not asserted in the proofs of claim, LBHI did not assume any broker dealer obligations, and all the other defenses that apply to the guarantee claims apply. And then they have consequential damages. And all we know about the consequential damages are what's in that footnote I read to you before, which simply says that they have consequential damages without offering any factual support, any -- well, let me read it to you. In addition -- this is from the estimation motion objection footnote 3 --THE COURT: Which is tab? MR. LEVINE: Tab 4, I'm sorry. Tab 4, page 4. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LEVINE: Footnote 13, and they basically repeat this in their response to the objection motion they refer back to this paragraph. But this is basically all they said about --THE COURT: Other damages. MR. LEVINE: -- other damages, or lost investment

opportunities is what they call it.

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In addition to the 16.2 million recoverable by Maverick, the Maverick entities proofs of claim also reserve the right to seek interest and legal fees, and also generally asserted and preserve the right to pursue all amounts payable in connection with the prime brokerage agreements. And actually what it says the prime brokerage documents, which is a full list of agreements, not just the PB agreements and the guarantees. "Although Maverick believes the \$16.2 still owed to it provides ample justification to deny the estimation motion with respect to the Maverick entities. "Maverick expects that it may in the future continue to pursue any rights it may have to collect interest, legal fees, or other damages, including damages for lost investment opportunities or other items." And that footnote is basically repeated in their most recent objection, but lost investment opportunities, I mean, we know under New York law it's virtually --THE COURT: You don't have to spend time on this. MR. LEVINE: Okay. The final thing is I got

handed a note by Mr. Fail, let me just make a couple of

points that he asked me to make.

Another reason that Section 562 applies to the

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1 - in their papers they kind of suggest 562 is a measure of a 2 claim, how much a claim should be, but that's not right. 562 talks about damages. And then they say, well, New York 3 4 law says you could calculate damages on the date of breach, 5 and I agree with that. 6 But here we have a Bankruptcy Code provision, 7 which under the supremacy clause controls, which says that if under 562, if 562 applies, damages are measured as of the 8 9 termination date, rejection date, liquidation date. 10 And finally, we think that a fundamental problem with Maverick's approach under 562 is that it would suggest 11 12 that where 562 applies to a primary obligor, it might not 13 apply to a guarantor --14 THE COURT: You have a two tiered system with two 15 sets of books. 16 MR. LEVINE: -- two tier, you got it, Your Honor. 17 Then I'll sit down and let Your Honor -- thank you 18 very much for your patience. 19 THE COURT: Sure. 20 MR. FAIL: Can I just correct? Sorry. One more 21 thing and I won't correct Rick, Garrett Fail, Weil Gotshal 22 for the record. Your Honor asked the question before if we 23 were aware of any claims against LBHI that had a primary obligor Libby that were allowed, I said I wasn't. I've 24

since had a chance to check with my client, there was one

Pg 33 of 78 Page 33 claim that was allowed where the amount received by the counterparty was less than the claim allowed by Libby or the claim asserted against LBHI due to certain unique circumstances of an agreement. So we allowed one guarantee claim against LBHI, where we appropriately think the guarantee should be paid. In terms of the estimation motion, I said that there were largely two parties that were still disputing that. There are two additional claims, plus or minus a million dollars each that are also outstanding --THE COURT: Okay. MR. FAIL: -- that are disputing it. Other parties have claims outstanding with respect to estimation, but they won't be litigated if there's an agreement that those claims will be withdrawn on a date certain in the future. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FAIL: And in terms of claims that are being litigated, other Libby related, we spoke about SRM, Newport and Providence you're aware of. THE COURT: Yes. MR. FAIL: And there's one additional claim that I'm aware of, Highland, which is in mediation, a \$5 million claim, so I just wanted to be complete for the record.

THE COURT: All right.

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|    | Page 34  |
| 1  | MR. FAIL: All the unique circumstances.                      |
| 2  | THE COURT: It was just by way of background for              |
| 3  | me, it's neither here nor there in terms of legal arguments. |
| 4  | MR. FAIL: I agree, thank you.                                |
| 5  | MR. ROLL: Good morning, Your Honor.                          |
| 6  | THE COURT: How are you?                                      |
| 7  | MR. ROLL: I'm fine, Your Honor, how are you?                 |
| 8  | THE COURT: Good.   |
| 9  | MR. ROLL: William Roll of Sherman & Sterling                 |
| 10 | appearing on behalf of the Maverick entities. I'm here with  |
| 11 | my colleague, Randall Martin.                                |
| 12 | Just a program though if I might, Your Honor                 |
| 13 | THE COURT: Sure.   |
| 14 | MR. ROLL: if it's all right with the Court, I                |
| 15 | was hoping to afford Mr. Martin to argue at least some of    |
| 16 | this because he's  |
| 17 | THE COURT: Of course.  |
| 18 | MR. ROLL: done 99 percent of the work, so he                 |
| 19 | should have at least some of the fun.                        |
| 20 | THE COURT: Delighted.  |
| 21 | MR. ROLL: My intention is if we get things like              |
| 22 | the exculpatory provisions                                   |
| 23 | THE COURT: Sure.   |
| 24 | MR. ROLL: and the proof of claims, I'm going                 |
| 25 | to turn that over to him.                                    |

Page 35 1 THE COURT: Sure. I want to ask you a couple of 2 questions, though --3 MR. ROLL: Of course. 4 THE COURT: -- right off the bat. 5 So suppose there was no Lehman filing broadly 6 speaking and life just went on. 7 MR. ROLL: Yes. 8 THE COURT: Right? And the Maverick entities 9 decide to part ways with Libby. And they terminated the 10 prime brokerage agreement. 11 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. 12 THE COURT: Give me back my stuff, we're going to 13 go to another broker dealer. 14 MR. ROLL: Right. 15 THE COURT: Okay. And at that moment in time, the 16 custody and securities were worth less than what they were 17 when you gave them to Libby. 18 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. THE COURT: Would you have a right to call in the 19 20 guarantee for the diminution in value? 21 MR. ROLL: Well, there would be no diminution in 22 value, as Your Honor has articulated that hypothetical, 23 because we would be looking at just that one date. 24 THE COURT: I'm sorry, no, my hypothetical is that 25 on the -- at the commencement of the relationship with the

Page 36 1 prime broker --2 MR. ROLL: Right. 3 THE COURT: -- with LBHI as a guarantor --MR. ROLL: Right. 4 5 THE COURT: -- you -- custodies, securities that 6 were say a billion dollars --7 MR. ROLL: Correct. 8 THE COURT: -- okay. And then you decide you're 9 going to go with a different broker dealer, right, and you 10 terminate. And you say to Libby, give me back my stuff, 11 right. And Libby says, sure, here's your stuff. Okay. Or 12 Libby says, and you agree, well, we don't want back our 13 stuff, we just want the value of our stuff. And the value of the stuff on that date is half a million dollars less, 14 right. You get to go ask for that half a million dollars 15 16 from your guarantor? 17 MR. ROLL: No. 18 THE COURT: Why not? MR. ROLL: Because we would have -- well, Your 19 20 Honor started with a very big if. No bankruptcy filing, so 21 we're in a normal relationship, so we, Maverick, would be 22 taking a risk in that circumstance of asking for its 23 securities back --24 THE COURT: Why is that --25 MR. ROLL: -- at a time when the value would've

Page 37 1 diminished. 2 THE COURT: Why does that not apply in this situation? 3 MR. ROLL: Because of the application of 502 in 4 the Bankruptcy Code, because of the fact that --5 6 THE COURT: So you get more in bankruptcy than you 7 would out of bankruptcy? 8 MR. ROLL: Because --9 THE COURT: You get an enhanced claim against a 10 bankrupt guarantor. 11 MR. ROLL: In these -- in the circumstances 12 presented here --13 THE COURT: That's pretty good stuff. MR. ROLL: It's good stuff, but it's consistent 14 15 with the law. And I think it's important to note that Your 16 Honor's hypothetical, it's a fair question, but in that 17 circumstance, Maverick could have taken -- made the choice 18 at any point along the way to say, give me my stuff back. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. ROLL: With the bankruptcy having intervened, 21 we didn't have that choice. So in Your Honor's hypothetical 22 we could have said, well, you know --23 THE COURT: You realize what you just said. When 24 the bankruptcy intervened, you didn't have that choice. So 25 that's consistent with the application of the exculpation.

Page 38 1 It's the absence of choice that was --2 MR. ROLL: In terms of the number, because --3 that's all I was really getting at, Your Honor. Because 4 when the bankruptcy intervened, when -- and let's, you know 5 6 THE COURT: Go back to my hypothetical, you know, 7 because a guarantee is a guarantee --8 MR. ROLL: Correct. 9 THE COURT: -- according to you. 10 MR. ROLL: Right. 11 THE COURT: So when you -- you get a guarantee 12 from LBHI parent --13 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. THE COURT: -- and then you decide to terminate --14 15 MR. ROLL: Right. 16 THE COURT: -- and your stuff is worth less, you 17 have a guarantee. Well, I don't understand why out of 18 bankruptcy you would not be able to then say, make good on 19 the guarantee. 20 MR. ROLL: We have a guarantee for whatever the 21 obligation is at that point. 22 THE COURT: At the point of the termination. 23 MR. ROLL: No, no. In this particular instance, 24 there was no termination. The value of the guarantee 25 derives from the claim we're able to assert under Section

502 of the Bankruptcy Code against LBIE on or LBHI and LBIE on the petition date --

THE COURT: But the claim was unliquidated on the petition date.

MR. ROLL: Understood. But New York law says, it's a New York law governing contract, New York law says the damages are measured from the date of the breach. The breach occurred on the date they went into administration, which is the same date that LBHI filed for Chapter 11.

So that's when things begin. And on that date, we have a claim against LBIE under New York law for the amount of the securities, i.e., you know, what they're holding because they breached the obligations to return those.

We have a claim under the guarantor, as of that same date for that same amount, but we can't exercise it, we can't exercise the right under the guarantee because LBHI has filed.

So at that point and from that point, we have a claim for 108, at least 118 the value of the securities at that point in cash, which they don't dispute. Every day from that point, until we get to March of 2012, and under the LBHI theory today, everything changes at that point.

They say, well, the settlement agreement is entered into, it effectuates a payment in full to Maverick, the liability under all the agreements, including guarantee

is extinguished and everybody goes home, but that's not quite right.

That doesn't take into account the -- two things, two sets of things. The first thing is the facts, what actually happened at that point, which is there was a -- LBIE's liability and the damages was actually compromised at that point, following a real live negotiation engaged in by real live people coming up with a real live agreement, which Mr. Levine quoted from, and I'm going to quote from too.

That said because of the positions taken in that negotiation and because of the application of UK insolvency law, all you're going to get, Maverick, at this point, is the value that UK insolvency law would say you get, which is the value of the cash and securities at that point, the 10149.

But it didn't change what was owed to us under the guarantee, the amount of the claim for which was fixed as of the petition date, unless there's some basis on which it can be set that got terminated, and this was a question Your Honor put to Mr. Levine at the very beginning of his argument, you know, which is -- if it's not terminated --

THE COURT: But you're assuming your conclusion.

You're assuming that simply because there was an LBHI

petition date --

MR. ROLL: Uh-huh.

Page 41 1 THE COURT: -- and you can come up with a number -2 3 MR. ROLL: Right. THE COURT: -- a value of the securities on that 4 5 petition date, that that's the amount you get to assert 6 against LBHI on the guarantee. But that's not an argument, that's just ipsy dipsy, I mean --7 8 MR. ROLL: Under 502, the amount of claimants 9 fixed as of petition. 10 THE COURT: But that assumes that 562(a) does not 11 apply. 12 MR. ROLL: Well, 562(a) does not apply, and I can 13 go right into that if Your Honor would like. This may be 14 the nub of it, you know, they say the agreement -- the guarantee was terminated for two sets of reasons --15 16 THE COURT: Forget about whether it's terminated 17 or not. Assume it's not terminated. 18 MR. ROLL: If the guarantee -- if it is not 19 terminated and if the guarantee was terminated and 562 does 20 not apply, there should be absolutely no dispute that we're 21 entitled to what Section 502 would say, we can assert 22 against the guarantor which is the value as of the petition 23 date. Their entire argument on sufficiency rests on the 24 notion that we were somehow paid in full, which relates to 25 the very factee set of issues surrounding the numbers, and I

was going to get to --

THE COURT: What do you mean factee issues surrounding the numbers? There's no facts surrounding the numbers. You say you should be able to assert a claim on the guarantee for the 118 so essentially you can get distributions from LBHI that would catch you up and give you full recovery on the 118 as opposed to the 101, that you've already gotten.

MR. ROLL: I was referring to the back and forth between the parties in the negotiations, the evidence of which is not at all before the Court at this stage, that resulted in the number of 101.9 at the time we did the settlement with LBIE, that's what I was referring to.

But the second part of their, you know, you were paid in full argument is that the guarantee was terminated, and therefore 562 kicks in and that's how you measure the damages. But let's think about that. 562 requires at least three things, a specific party, a specific kind of an agreement, and a specific action being undertaken on behalf -- by that party with respect to that agreement.

We're not going to fight about, you know, the specific party here, you know, whether it's a securities contract or whatever, but we do take issue with the notion that the guarantee was actually terminated in connection with the settlement, because it clearly was not.

Pq 43 of 78 Page 43 1 The settlement agreement itself says, quite 2 clearly that it's terminating the relationship between LBIE and Maverick and not anybody else, and it specifically 3 reserves to Maverick the right to pursue claims against any 4 5 other Lehman entity. 6 THE COURT: Sure, but you know, this is where you 7 go into your, you know, your Ivanho argument which you think 8 is a show stopper. But the fact of the matter is that all 9 of that only stands for the proposition that had claims 10 against LBIE, claims -- if LBIE had not been 100 percent 11 payor, you would unquestionably be able to assert the full 12 amount of that claim against LBHI so that you could become 13 paid in full, but you got paid in full by LBIE on the 101. 14 MR. ROLL: We got paid 101, but that was not --15 that was clearly not payment in full in the eyes of the 16 Maverick people. 17 THE COURT: So let me ask you a different 18 question. Let's take a little walk around the Bankruptcy 19 Code. MR. ROLL: Okay. 20 21 THE COURT: 502(b)(6).

22 MR. ROLL: 502(b)(6), okay.

23 THE COURT: All right. The cap on lease rejection

24 damages.

25 MR. ROLL: Okay.

Page 44 1 See, he is smarter than you, he knows THE COURT: 2 exactly what it is. 3 MR. MARTIN: We were going to bring up this 4 example, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So 502(b)(6) says 6 if, you know, if you reject a lease, your damages are capped 7 pursuant to 502(b)(6). 8 MR. ROLL: Right. 9 THE COURT: Right. And the landlord might say, 10 well, that's really nice, tenant debtor, but I've got this 11 nice guarantee. Okay. So I would think that you would tell 12 me, see, that's just like this, we've got this guarantee so 13 that the allowance of the lesser amount pursuant to the 14 Bankruptcy Code doesn't mean that I don't get to assert the 15 full amount of my damages against my guarantor, right. 16 MR. ROLL: Correct. 17 THE COURT: Okay. However, under the Bankruptcy 18 Code if your guarantor is a debtor it doesn't work that way, 19 the cap applies. 20 So this notion that there's some greater ability to recover under applicable -- I put in air quotes, although 21 22 air quotes have been much maligned nowadays -- applicable 23 non-bankruptcy law, you know, doesn't necessarily fly. And 24 here I draw an analogy to the way 562(a) works both as a 25 matter of policy and actually by its terms --

Pq 45 of 78 Page 45 1 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. 2 THE COURT: -- to rebut the concept that, you 3 know, a guarantee, is a guarantee, is a guarantee, and you 4 get more than your -- the obligation owed to you by your 5 primary obligor, which is in fact what you're seeking. 6 MR. ROLL: Right. 7 THE COURT: You're seeking more than what your 8 primary obligor owed you. 9 MR. ROLL: Because of the operation of UK 10 insolvency rules so we get the value of the securities on 11 that date. And there is law from the southern district, 12 stated in our papers, which they don't deal with, unless I 13 missed it, and I don't think I did, the Instituto (ph) case on page 14 of our --14 15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 16 MR. ROLL: -- objection, which basically says that 17 the discharge -- a guarantor's obligations on the guarantee 18 are not discharged by reason of discharge of the primary obligor's obligations as a result of foreign bankruptcy law. 19 20 That's still good law from the district court here, and they 21 don't address it at. 22 So as a result of that that discharge at the level

of 101.9 as a result of the negotiations we had with them over what counted and what didn't to get to the final number, means that we still retain the full amount of the

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Pq 46 of 78 Page 46 claim against the quarantor, you know, irregardless of what happens in connection with the foreign bankruptcy proceeding. So you still have that, and if you combine that with Ivanho (ph) that means we can still recover -- we can still assert the full amount of the claim against the coobligor/guarantor up to the point of payment in full, payment in full being defined by New York law in this circumstance, because damages are measured as of the date of the breach, against the guarantor. So -- and I sense that Your Honor apprehends that this is the argument, because this is where the Court started with Mr. Levine, so I know that I'm not saying anything that Your Honor doesn't already know that we're going to say, but that really is the nub of the argument. What I would say with respect to the hypothetical scenarios and the 506(b), you know, I'm not smart enough to parse 506(b) on the fly, maybe Mr. Martin can do it, he can --THE COURT: 502(b)(6). MR. ROLL: 502(b)(6), I'm sorry -- you know, maybe he can do it and fix whatever I've left unfixed at that point, but respectfully we're not dealing with a hypothetical circumstance.

THE COURT: But we're not -- but we're also not

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Page 47 1 dealing with New York law, we're dealing with the Bankruptcy 2 Code and we're dealing with the operation of 562(a) --3 MR. ROLL: Right. THE COURT: -- under the Bankruptcy Code two 4 5 securities contracts. 6 MR. ROLL: But -- right. 7 THE COURT: Which is -- the prime brokerage agreement certainly is, and which the guarantee certainly 8 9 is. MR. ROLL: Well we'll assume that for the purposes 10 of this argument, but that's only two -- that's two-thirds 11 -- or that's one-third, and I'll concede the other third --12 13 THE COURT: Why isn't --14 MR. ROLL: Because it was not terminated. It was 15 not terminated in connection with the settlement, period, 16 full stop, because of what the parties did and because of 17 what the documents provide. THE COURT: Well but there's terminate and there's 18 terminated, right? To the extent that the underlying 19 20 relationship terminates, right, let's go back to my 21 502(b)(5) example --22 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. 23 THE COURT: -- to the extent that the underlying 24 relationship terminates I'm not exactly sure what the 25 termination of a guarantee means. There are no ongoing --

Page 48 1 there's no ongoing relationship between the primary obligor 2 and the primary obligee, but the obligation of the guarantor to pay it is what it is as of that moment in time. 3 MR. ROLL: But the guarantee itself tells us what 4 5 it means for the guarantee to not exist -- for the 6 obligations under the guarantee to not exist. And we should 7 look at that. There's only one instance in which the 8 quarantee itself -- and this is the one that's toward the 9 back of the book, I forget which tab it is -- but it's the 10 one that the parties have referred to as the LBHI quarantee. 11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 12 MR. ROLL: 4(c). THE COURT: Uh-huh. 13 14 MR. ROLL: If Your Honor would look at the --15 THE COURT: But you have to deal with the language 16 that says that -- the termination language that says that 17 all obligations --18 MR. ROLL: Uh-huh. THE COURT: -- are terminated. 19 20 MR. ROLL: You're talking about the language in 21 the settlement agreement. 22 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. ROLL: All obligations of LBIE. 23 24 THE COURT: No, but that's not exactly right. 25 Let me -- you show me what you wanted to show me.

|    | Page 49   |  |  |
|----|---|--|--|
| 1  | MR. ROLL: I'll show well let's go to the                  |  |  |
| 2  | let's talk about the settlement agreement first           |  |  |
| 3  | THE COURT: Sure.  |  |  |
| 4  | MR. ROLL: because we're on it, and then we'll             |  |  |
| 5  | go back to the guarantee.                                 |  |  |
| 6  | THE COURT: What's give me the tab, please.                |  |  |
| 7  | MR. MARTIN: 4(e).   |  |  |
| 8  | MR. ROLL: 4(e) for the settlement agreement.              |  |  |
| 9  | THE COURT: 4(e). Okay.                                    |  |  |
| 10 | MR. ROLL: If Your Honor would look at paragraph           |  |  |
| 11 | 2.1(a), I think this is one of those that Mr. Levine may  |  |  |
| 12 | have actually pointed Your Honor to.                      |  |  |
| 13 | THE COURT: Yep.   |  |  |
| 14 | MR. ROLL: But it says the relevant agreements and         |  |  |
| 15 | all transactions thereunder                               |  |  |
| 16 | THE COURT: Uh-huh.  |  |  |
| 17 | MR. ROLL: are terminated as between LBIE and              |  |  |
| 18 | each Maverick entity. It doesn't say anything about LBHI, |  |  |
| 19 | it doesn't say anything about the                         |  |  |
| 20 | THE COURT: No, I'm thinking of                            |  |  |
| 21 | MR. ROLL: guarantee.                                      |  |  |
| 22 | THE COURT: a different provision. I'll have               |  |  |
| 23 | to find it.   |  |  |
| 24 | MR. ROLL: Okay. But this one doesn't go away, I           |  |  |
| 25 | mean this one is here.                                    |  |  |

The second part of that, subsection (b) says that this deed shall be a full and final settlement of all rights, obligations, liabilities, and claims, et cetera, et cetera, which LBIE and each Maverick entity may have against one another, including, but not limited to, and it goes on from there. And it doesn't say anything about LBHI. THE COURT: Well --MR. ROLL: And they knew about LBHI at the time and they knew about the guarantee. You can then look at paragraph 2.3, which is the release language, the releases, which are actually once litigated you can say that's the most operative part of any settlement agreement most important, and the one where it's most important to be clear provides that it's only the Maverick entities and LBIE that are releasing each other with respect to all claims. Again, the parties knew about LBHI and the guarantee.

THE COURT: But the guarantee says that the guarantee will remain in full force and effect until the first two occur of --

MR. ROLL: Right.

THE COURT: -- the obligations defined term, no longer in existence, and the prime brokerage guarantee defines obligations as all obligations under the agreements,

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Page 51 1 a defined term, and the defined term agreements includes the 2 prime brokerage agreements, the GMSLAs, and the letter 3 agreement, and the MLAs. So --4 MR. ROLL: But the obligations no longer being in 5 existence is not a termination under this language. 6 Termination is -- this is the point I was trying to get to 7 before. Termination is effectuated by notice. Obligations no longer being in existence means, has to be based on the 8 9 other language in this document, paid in full, and that has 10 to mean --11 THE COURT: You're ignoring the language --12 MR. ROLL: -- under New York law. 13 THE COURT: -- that says the guarantee will remain 14 in full force and effect. 15 MR. ROLL: Right. Until the first --16 THE COURT: Until the obligations are no longer in 17 existence. 18 MR. ROLL: But the obligations are in fact in existence. The obligations are still in existence because 19 20 we have not been paid in full --21 THE COURT: Can you hold on one second? 22 MR. ROLL: Certainly. 23 THE COURT: Hold on one second. 24 (Pause) 25 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Roll, sorry.

MR. ROLL: I would just contend, Your Honor, that that -- you know, termination is the trigger for 562. My point is that the obligations no longer being in existence is not a termination point, it has to do with actual payment in full.

And the reason I say that is, that position is consistent with the rest of the language in the agreement, which actually indicates that there are certain circumstances in which the obligations still remain. In fact the very next sentence. Termination of this guarantee shall not affect the guarantor's liability hereunder as to the obligations incurred or arising out of transactions entered into it prior to the termination thereof.

So obligations still being in existence is separate and apart from termination. It's a separate concept.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROLL: And there's actually another provision in here that says the obligations can spring back to life if they -- even if they've been paid in full and a bankruptcy proceeding allows them to be avoided -- payments to Maverick to be avoided.

So termination and obligations being paid in full are two different concepts in this guarantee, and I think it was carefully drafted for that reason, and -- or to

Pg 53 of 78 Page 53 establish that or to leave to be a readily ascertainable inference to draw from the document. And it must mean, I think any way, and we've made this point in the papers, that paid in full doesn't relate to terminating the obligations of LBIE as a result of the operation of UK (indiscernible) and the settlement and whatever was done there and whatever was left open or not, but rather New York law, which says the damages are measured as of the petition date, which is the date of the breach. THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to -- we should turn to anything you want to say about exculpation and we should turn to anything you want to say about direct claims and/or amendments. MR. ROLL: Yeah, on that, Your Honor, I'll turn it over to Mr. Martin who will cover exculpation. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROLL: Probably the other items as well, but if not I can come back on this. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROLL: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MARTIN: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. MARTIN: Thank you for indulging out --THE COURT: No problem.

MR. MARTIN: -- tag team presentation.

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Page 54 1 THE COURT: Always like it when the younger person 2 teaches the older person a thing or two. 3 MR. MARTIN: I don't think that's going to happen today, but --4 5 MR. ROLL: I actually appreciate it too, Your 6 Honor. 7 MR. MARTIN: Could I touch on briefly the example 8 in the question that you opened with to Mr. Roll? 9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 MR. MARTIN: Because I think that you're creating 11 a hypothetical that can't and won't happen in the real 12 world. And it is the case that we are not asserting a claim 13 for one penny more than we are entitled to outside of 14 bankruptcy. 15 You raised the hypothetical in which we went --16 THE COURT: Hold on one second. 17 (Pause) 18 THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. MARTIN: You proposed a hypothetical in which 19 20 we wanted to terminate our relationship with the Lehman 21 entities outside of bankruptcy. 22 THE COURT: Uh-huh 23 MR. MARTIN: Every day outside of bankruptcy that 24 we have a long position open, we're betting on Apple stock, 25 for instance, we are assuming the risk that Apple stock goes

|    | Page 55  |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|
| 1  | up or down.  |  |  |
| 2  | THE COURT: Yes.  |  |  |
| 3  | MR. MARTIN: So it's custody with them, but every             |  |  |
| 4  | day we have it with them.                                    |  |  |
| 5  | THE COURT: You do have that risk, right.                     |  |  |
| 6  | MR. MARTIN: And so if we tell them we want to                |  |  |
| 7  | terminate the relationship, please give us our securities    |  |  |
| 8  | back or the monetary (indiscernible)                         |  |  |
| 9  | THE COURT: Uh-huh.   |  |  |
| 10 | MR. MARTIN: they have to give it back to us.                 |  |  |
| 11 | THE COURT: Uh-huh.   |  |  |
| 12 | MR. MARTIN: If they take two years to execute                |  |  |
| 13 | that instruction and during that two years after which we've |  |  |
| 14 | told them we don't want to be invested in Apple stock        |  |  |
| 15 | THE COURT: Uh-huh.   |  |  |
| 16 | MR. MARTIN: we get the Apple stock back and                  |  |  |
| 17 | its declined in value  |  |  |
| 18 | THE COURT: Right. That's                                     |  |  |
| 19 | MR. MARTIN: in that case, yes, the guarantee                 |  |  |
| 20 | kicks in.  |  |  |
| 21 | THE COURT: That's a fair clarification.                      |  |  |
| 22 | But here this goes right this takes us right to              |  |  |
| 23 | exculpation. Here LBIE filed.                                |  |  |
| 24 | MR. MARTIN: It filed, that's right.                          |  |  |
| 25 | THE COURT: And that's what caused the delay.                 |  |  |

Page 56 1 MR. MARTIN: I don't think that our claim was 2 caused by a bankruptcy. Our claim is based on the fact --THE COURT: Why didn't you get your securities 3 back sooner? You didn't get your securities back sooner 4 5 because there was a bankruptcy. 6 MR. MARTIN: But surely that's not what the force 7 majeure clause was intended to capture and pick up. 8 THE COURT: You don't think? 9 MR. MARTIN: It talks about tornados, it talks 10 about insurrections, it does not reference --11 THE COURT: It does not reference --12 MR. MARTIN: -- bankruptcy. THE COURT: -- specifically -- well Judge Glenn in 13 14 MF Global certainly thought that suspension of trading by 15 SIPA with respect to LBI was pretty much of a financial 16 tornado. 17 MR. MARTIN: Respectfully we think he's wrong. It's a term of art in the financial world. On suspension of 18 19 trading I think we have a half page footnote --20 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARTIN: -- citing what a suspension of 21 22 trading means. Critically I also think that the MF Global 23 24 language and exculpation clause also included a reference to 25 This one does not. So there is an important all laws.

Page 57 1 distinction between the language that was at issue in that 2 case and our language. And the other thing, Your Honor, that makes it I 3 4 think crystal clear to me, that the guarantee could not have 5 been eviscerated by a force majeure clause, is that the 6 guarantee itself says as much. 7 I'm at the third paragraph of paragraph -- of tab 8 C --9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. MARTIN: -- behind tab 4 --11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. MARTIN: -- and there's a provision in the 13 guarantee that expressly notes that the obligations under 14 the guarantee kick in if we are the subject of a claw-back 15 resulting from a preference. 16 THE COURT: Where are you? 17 MR. MARTIN: It's the third full paragraph down, 18 Your Honor. It's about two-thirds of the way down. 19 THE COURT: This guarantee is? 20 MR. MARTIN: Correct. And if you read that whole 21 paragraph what you'll see is that it expressly and 22 unambiguously contemplates that they will have to pay us 23 under the guarantee if we are the subject of a claw-back 24 with respect to a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

Pg 58 of 78 Page 58 1 MR. MARTIN: That can mean one thing only. 2 Now, I know we're not making a claim based on a 3 preference and I know we're not making a claim based on a 4 fraudulent conveyance, but what this unambiguously means is 5 that if as a consequence of a bankruptcy we don't get paid 6 in full this guarantee is triggered. The parties said as 7 much. 8 And what else is a guarantee for? 9 THE COURT: It doesn't say that, let alone 10 unambiguously say that, but it's interesting. 11 MR. MARTIN: A preference would be consequence of 12 a bankruptcy. 13 THE COURT: I'm going to decline your invitation to go down that path, because that's not what this says. 14 15 It's --16 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, we had some points to 17 make on netting as well if you'd like to hear those. I don't know if those are the --18 19 THE COURT: I actually would not. I think I'm 20 okay on netting. 21 The only other thing that I'm interested in 22 hearing is about this concept that there's either an embedded direct claim in the claims that were filed or that 23 24 the Maverick entities ought to be allowed to amend to assert

a direct claim, which seems to include some notion of lost

Page 59 1 investment opportunities. Is that on you or Mr. Roll? 2 MR. MARTIN: I can handle it, Your Honor. 3 MR. ROLL: That's perfectly fine. Counsel is 4 being generous to us and preserving our right. We're not taking the position that there is a 5 6 direct claim embedded in the proof of claim. THE COURT: Okay. Because I didn't see. 7 8 MR. MARTIN: And it's not there. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. MARTIN: However, and this is critical, and 11 this speaks importantly to a point that you were discussing 12 with Mr. Roll. An absolute and unconditional guarantee of 13 payment is a standalone document under New York law and a 14 standalone series of obligations. 15 So our point on the direct claim is that it is so 16 similar to the claim asserted with respect to the guarantee 17 claim that we should be permitted opportunity to amend, if 18 necessary, although that only comes into play if you 19 disagree with Mr. Roll that 562 doesn't apply because the 20 guarantee wasn't terminated. We don't need the direct claim 21 otherwise so there's no need for you to resolve that unless 22 you go against us on 562. 23 THE COURT: But here's the part I don't 24 understand. If you think you have a claim for the delta 25 between 101- and 118- --

|    | Page 60  |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|
| 1  | MR. MARTIN: Uh-huh.  |  |  |
| 2  | THE COURT: which you do.                                     |  |  |
| 3  | MR. MARTIN: Correct.   |  |  |
| 4  | THE COURT: Okay? Then you think you have a claim             |  |  |
| 5  | for lost investment opportunities, because I assume that the |  |  |
| 6  | theory of the claim is that if we had had that \$5 million   |  |  |
| 7  | for that period of time we would have invested in all this   |  |  |
| 8  | great stuff and we would have made all this money.           |  |  |
| 9  | So the notion that you have that claim but you               |  |  |
| 10 | didn't assert that, it just doesn't make any sense.          |  |  |
| 11 | MR. MARTIN: You're switching I think from the                |  |  |
| 12 | direct claim to the consequential damages claim, and those   |  |  |
| 13 | are two different things in my mind. And I do think, Your    |  |  |
| 14 | Honor, the proof of claim did adequately address our theory  |  |  |
| 15 | of consequential damages.                                    |  |  |
| 16 | THE COURT: You think a guarantee claim includes a            |  |  |
| 17 | claim for loss investment opportunities?                     |  |  |
| 18 | MR. MARTIN: I think our proof of claim                       |  |  |
| 19 | THE COURT: Really?   |  |  |
| 20 | MR. MARTIN: adequately stated yes, Your                      |  |  |
| 21 | Honor.   |  |  |
| 22 | THE COURT: Where does it say that?                           |  |  |
| 23 | MR. MARTIN: Under tab 5, page 2, the first                   |  |  |
| 24 | sorry the last sentence, it's about halfway down on page     |  |  |
| 25 | 2 in Roman I.  |  |  |

|    | Py 01 01 78  |  |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|--|
|    | Page 61  |  |  |  |
| 1  | THE COURT: Uh-huh.   |  |  |  |
| 2  | MR. MARTIN: This is a very broad and very general            |  |  |  |
| 3  | statement, Your Honor. We said, this proof of claim          |  |  |  |
| 4  | constitutes a demand for payment under the guarantee. This   |  |  |  |
| 5  | is a payment of any amount owed as a result of the breach of |  |  |  |
| 6  | the guarantee which occurred under New York State law as of  |  |  |  |
| 7  | the petition date.   |  |  |  |
| 8  | THE COURT: So you can say to me today that                   |  |  |  |
| 9  | statement means that we have a claim for lost investment     |  |  |  |
| 10 | opportunities for \$50 million? Surprise LBHI, how's your    |  |  |  |
| 11 | reserve looking? I mean that's                               |  |  |  |
| 12 | MR. MARTIN: There should be                                  |  |  |  |
| 13 | THE COURT: it doesn't work that way. Okay?                   |  |  |  |
| 14 | It doesn't work that way.                                    |  |  |  |
| 15 | MR. MARTIN: Are there any other points that Your             |  |  |  |
| 16 | Honor would like to be addressed?                            |  |  |  |
| 17 | THE COURT: All right.  |  |  |  |
| 18 | MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor.                           |  |  |  |
| 19 | THE COURT: Thank you. Clean up, anyone?                      |  |  |  |
| 20 | MR. LEVINE: Yeah, Your Honor, I'd appreciate I               |  |  |  |
| 21 | can be very quick.   |  |  |  |
| 22 | THE COURT: I'm going to hold you to that.                    |  |  |  |
| 23 | MR. LEVINE: Fair enough. You've been very                    |  |  |  |
| 24 | generous with your time.                                     |  |  |  |
| 25 | Okay. So the first thing, I just wanted to                   |  |  |  |

Page 62 1 enforce a few things that Your Honor questioned counsel 2 In terms of the exculpation provision and what 3 happened after Libby filed for administration, on page 8 of 4 their response --THE COURT: And counsel cited a district court 5 6 case that says it's dispositive in their favor of that 7 argument that --8 MR. LEVINE: Well what I was going to point you 9 to, Your Honor --10 THE COURT: Yeah. 11 MR. LEVINE: -- was their own statement. I'm 12 reading from their brief, and you know, that in opposition 13 to the current objection, the one they filed. 14 Libby -- under the -- this is tab 2, page 8, if 15 you want to read along, paragraph 22. The Maverick claims 16 are straightforward. Under the prime brokerage agreements 17 and the New York Uniform Commercial Code, Libby was 18 obligated to return all custody, cash, and securities to the Maverick entities upon request. Libby however was not in 19 20 the position to do so after having commenced its 21 administration proceedings. 22 To me that consistently would require rulings. 23 That is under clause 28 of the PB agreement. You'll agree that Lehman Brothers will be liable for any loss caused 24 25 directly or indirectly by government restrictions, exchange

or market rulings -- that doesn't really apply -- suspension of trading. They couldn't perform. They admit the reason they have a new offer is because once Libby filed for an administration it wasn't able to trade, it wasn't able to perform. To me that's clearly covered.

In terms of the lost opportunities, the last sentence of paragraph 29 of the PB agreement says, in no event with Lehman Brothers be liable for any special, indirect, incidental, or consequential damages. Lost investment opportunities or quintessential for consequential damages. Consequential damages you almost never get unless you have a specific instrument you can point to.

In terms of the guarantee. Your Honor I think was completely on point when you were directly counsel to the last paragraph on the first page of the guarantee. This guarantee will remain in full force and effect until -- until means something -- the first two occur of the obligations are no longer in existence.

As you pointed out the obligations refer back to Libby's obligations as a guarantee. It's not direct obligations, it's guaranteed obligations. Libby's obligations were completely released and extinguished by the settlement.

And in terms of the distinction which I don't really understand between termination and ending of the

guarantee, the next sentence says, termination of this guarantee shall not effect. Clearly it understood the prior sentence to relate to a termination of the guarantee.

As you know that, you know, we don't think it matters for 562 whether the guarantee was terminated, even though we think it was, because it governs damages in relation to securities contracts, master nettings agreements, the damages at issue are those that are running under the prime brokerage documents which I think is clearly under the very, very broad language of the second circuit in --

THE COURT: Madoff.

MR. LEVINE: -- Card versus Ira Fishman (ph), including they specifically call out were it not for the account documents -- I'm reading from the second circuit decision -- were it not for the account documents there would be no basis for a customer to make deposits or request withdrawals.

Their attempt to distinguish the PB agreement from the definition of a securities contract, because what they want was to get their securities back and not buy or sell trades, is specifically described by the second circuit as something that made the account agreements there a securities contract.

And finally, Your Honor, I mean just to be kind of

Page 65 1 crude, they paid \$30 million. They paid \$30 million to 2 Libby. 3 You know, you can't have an obligation to the 4 priming obligor and think you have a guarantee claim, it 5 just doesn't make sense. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. LEVINE: Thank you. THE COURT: All right. So, last licks, Mr. Roll? 8 9 MR. ROLL: Please, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Sure. 11 MR. ROLL: And I promise, I will be quicker than 12 Mr. Levine. And I appreciate the time --THE COURT: Sure. 13 14 MR. ROLL: -- I appreciate everyone's patience. 15 The last point we paid \$30 million, we would have 16 paid a lot less if we had gotten full credit for the 17 securities cash that they had that they owed us, so that's a 18 red herring. 19 THE COURT: What do you mean if you had gotten 20 full credit --MR. ROLL: If we had gotten everything that we 21 22 thought we were entitled to under -- from LBIE, if all the 23 positions had been closed out as we requested and the 24 resisted in the course of the negotiations we would have 25 ended up paying less.

Page 66 1 So it's -- it doesn't mean that we weren't 2 entitled to --3 THE COURT: Okay. Well I don't want -- I'm not --MR. ROLL: But --4 5 THE COURT: I really am trying to resist anyone 6 luring me away -- into contested facts, so. 7 MR. ROLL: Well I was going to stop at that point. The bottom line on that is, it is part of a set of contested 8 9 facts which is inappropriate at a sufficiency hearing, and 10 they know full well that there was a lot more to the story 11 of what went on in those negotiations and what's in the 12 papers, because --13 THE COURT: Okay. But you're doing precisely what I said I'm not -- I don't believe that there's a need to go 14 15 beyond the undisputed facts --16 MR. ROLL: Okay. 17 THE COURT: -- of using the 101- and comparing it 18 to the 118- that is now being sought. 19 MR. ROLL: Then I'll close on this point, Your 20 Honor. 21 With respect to the termination of the guarantee 22 as a matter of fact it was not terminated, absolutely --23 THE COURT: What about the plan provision? What 24 about the argument that once you get to the plan it's over, 25 it's rejected?

Pg 67 of 78 Page 67 1 MR. ROLL: As an executory contract? 2 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. ROLL: I think it fails the countrymen test, 3 there were no remaining obligations on the part of Maverick, 4 so I don't think it actually qualifies as an executory 5 6 contract. And we saw that for the first time in their reply 7 brief, you know, that's my knee reaction to that. It's the 8 first we had heard of that. But again, I don't think it 9 meets the test for an executory contract. This is the point I wanted to close on. 10 quarantee was not terminated as a matter of fact or law or 11 12 else there would have been no reason for the existence in 13 the settlement agreement of the provision that preserved for 14 us the right to proceed against other Lehman entities. That 15 can only mean that we had the right to proceed on other 16 obligations held by other Lehman entities, including LBHI, 17 including the guarantee. 18 And on the proof of claim issue, you know, LBHI is really claiming they're surprised by the consequential 19 20 damages point which we have been discussing with them for 21 quite some time and they know it --22 THE COURT: It's not a question of what you've 23 been discussing with them, it's a question of what the proof

of claim says, so.

MR. ROLL: And if they believe it's not fairly set

24

forth, if the Court believes it's not fairly set forth we would respectfully ask for the opportunity to move to amend to make that claim, because we believe sincerely it's been clear to them all along, and if need be to make it clearer we'll do it in writing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROLL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So you can probably tell that I spent a lot of time on this before today, but I very much wanted to hear from you, because the issues are many, and here's the thing, you're entitled to, and I think this probably merits a full-blown written opinion. When that would occur just look around. Starting trial in another Lehman matter on April 3rd, 150 million at issue. As soon as that's over starting trial on another Lehman matter in which the amount at issue is \$2 billion. That promises to take me into 2018, and that's just Lehman. I have a full docket otherwise. So I don't want to deprive you of what's you're entitled to, but I'd also like to help you progress beyond today.

So I'm going to give you my bullet points, what my ruling -- what the decision will look like. Beyond that I can't give you a date when I would issue a formal memorandum opinion, but perhaps this could provide the bases for you to have further discussions and figure out whether you want to

wait, you know, exercise appeal rights, et cetera, et
cetera.

If there were 48 hours in the day or if there were two of me I could move more quickly, but it just -- it is what it is. So it was a good happenstance that I was able to even fit you in today for this hearing.

So the bottom line is that the Maverick claims should be disallowed and expunged. The claims have been satisfied in full by LBIE. Although claims are typically valued under the Code as of the petition date, here Section 562(a) is applicable and provides an alternative date for valuing claims that arise from the rejection, liquidation, termination, or acceleration of certain specified contracts, including master netting agreements, in quotes, and securities contracts, in quotes.

So the prime brokerage agreements are securities contracts and master netting agreements with the meaning of Section 562(a).

Maverick's arguments that its claims are not based on the securities contract aspects of the prime brokerage documents and thus are not subject to 562 fails because the argument is contrary not only to courts expansive reading of the term securities contracts, and more specifically the second circuits holding in the Madoff case find that brokerage account agreement similar to those here are in

fact securities contracts, and that's explored in some detail at pages 5 to 7 of Lehman's reply.

Mavericks' severability agreement, as I'll call it, ignores the fact that the prime brokerage guarantee is a separate securities agreement under the Code, and regardless whether certain obligations arising under the prime brokerage agreements are severable, which I don't believe that they are, Section 562(a) applies here because the claims are based upon a guarantee which qualifies as "a security agreement or other arrangement or other credit enhancement related to a securities contract or a master netting agreement." And once again, these definitions of these important terms are spelled out on Lehman's reply on page 7.

So the operative date for valuing the claims un 562(a) is the settlement date, which is March 30, 2012, the date of the Maverick LBIE settlement.

Each of the prime brokerage agreements, including the guarantee, terminated on the settlement date. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement all quote/unquote obligations under the prime brokerage documents were -- to use the words of that agreement -- no longer in existence from and after the settlement date. Therefore, Maverick's reliance on the petition date for the valuation of its claims is simply not correct. The prime brokerage

agreements were terminated in all respects functionally not only as to LBIE.

Moreover, 562(a) would apply even if the guarantee had not been terminated, because nothing in 562(a) requires a guarantee be terminated for such section to apply. 562 governs the measurement of damages, quote/unquote, in connection with, among other things, the termination of securities contracts and master netting agreements.

As Lehman correctly points out, Maverick's reading of Section 562(a) would limit its applicability and in effect create a two-tier system of measuring damages.

First, primary claims in accordance with Section 562(a) as of the date of contract rejection, termination, acceleration, or liquidation; and two, related guarantee claims measured as of a different date.

I believe that this is incompatible with the policy behind such guarantees, which are given in essence to assure that the liability of the prime principal obligator, the primary obligor is satisfied, which is what occurred here.

Value of the Maverick guarantee claims are covered by Section 562(a), they were valued at one hundred and one point nine million dollars as of the settlement date, which was the date that Maverick was made whole by LBIE.

Maverick cited Ivanho, but Ivanho and its progeny

merely stand for the proposition that a creditor cannot recover more than the value of its claims or damages, and Ivanho does not enable Maverick to assert additional guarantee claim rights against LBHI.

Accordingly, I believe that Maverick cannot establish a guarantee claim against LBHI because it cannot establish any unsatisfied obligations of its primary obligor, LBIE.

Maverick recovered the full value of its long positions as of the settlement date. It would be contrary to commercial practice and commercial reality for a brokerage customer to be able to recover more from its primary obligor and guarantor in bankruptcy than it would outside of bankruptcy where a customer's economic exposure is measured on a net basis with the value of its long positions offset against its short positions.

In addition for reasons that I will elaborate further in a more complete written opinion, I do believe that Judge Glenn was correct in MF Global, I do believe that under the principles that he articulated and the terms of the documents here that the exculpation provisions would themselves preclude the allowance of in essence what is the diminution claim being asserted by the Maverick entities.

Finally, I do not believe that Maverick should be allowed to amend its claims in any respects. Failed

guarantee claims they are clear on its face and I don't believe that they have -- that it would be appropriate to allow them the opportunity to expand upon the theories of liability or the amount or nature of damages which had been asserted in the guarantee claims.

So that's kind of the short form of what I would write. I suppose I could give you the option of entering an order and attaching the transcript, or just ask you to wait, or a third option behind door number 3 would be to continue to talk to one another and see if you can come to a consensual resolution.

So it's not that I don't believe that this -every claimant's claim is very important, but I just have a
reality of what I'm dealing with in terms of when I'd be
able to turn something out that I would be willing to sign
as a memorandum opinion.

MR. ROLL: We understand that, Your Honor. I -respectfully I think we would choose a combination of one
and three, three being we'll continue to talk, and one being
not waiting. I mean we understand Your Honor is busy. If
Your Honor is inclined or is willing to enter an order with
the transcript attached that allows the right to -- affords
us the right and the opportunity to take to the next level
we would appreciate that.

THE COURT: Well I think fairness you'd have -- I'd

Page 74 1 want you to discuss that. 2 MR. ROLL: Okay. 3 THE COURT: Because I really don't want to be in 4 the position of depriving anyone of due process in any 5 respect and what they're entitled to, and I don't like -- I 6 don't want anyone to feel that I'm giving them short shrift. 7 MR. ROLL: I understand that, Your Honor. We're 8 sort of -- I'm trying to balance --9 THE COURT: Yeah, me too. 10 MR. ROLL: -- the need to get moving on it --11 THE COURT: Me too. MR. ROLL: -- and again, I don't want to burden 12 13 the Court. So we will continue to talk and if we may would 14 the Court permit us to get back to Your Honor --15 THE COURT: Sure. 16 MR. ROLL: -- with how to proceed? 17 THE COURT: Absolutely. 18 MR. ROLL: I will say this though, I've seen in other instances how capable the Court is in terms of turning 19 20 things out quickly and fully under tough circumstances, so. THE COURT: Well but just to be clear, because you 21 22 know, among us who, you know, practice in this building a 23 lot people who know what 502(b)(6) is --24 MR. ROLL: You will never let me forget that. 25 THE COURT: -- do not -- you're not -- no, you're

Page 75 1 not allowed to give him a hard time when you go back to the 2 office. 3 MR. ROLL: I'll give him a very good time, because 4 he did well. 5 THE COURT: Good. I do turn out things very 6 quickly, very voluminous things, but often those are 7 instances in which I have a real live living, breathing, 8 struggling to breath debtor --9 MR. ROLL: Understood. 10 THE COURT: -- and that makes for greater urgency. 11 So I'm trying to not dig myself deeper here, but --12 MR. ROLL: That's fine, Your Honor. We're happy to accommodate that, we'll talk to our friends on the other 13 14 side and we'll see what we can do. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. ROLL: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 18 (A chorus of thank you) THE COURT: Just together just email chambers and 19 20 just let us know which path you have elected to take, and 21 you need not call out the party who's accenting. 22 (Laughter) THE COURT: Okay? If there's a descent. If 23 24 there's agreement, great. If there's a descent just say, 25 you know, we're going to wait or whatever it is we're going

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 1
     to do.
 2
                MR. ROLL: Very well, Your Honor.
 3
                THE COURT: All right.
 4
           (A chorus of thank you)
 5
                THE COURT:
                            Thanks a lot. Have a great weekend.
 6
           (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:36
 7
     AM)
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Page 78 1 CERTIFICATION 2 We, Sheila Orms and Dawn South, certify that the foregoing 3 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Digitally signed by Sheila Orms Sheila Orms DN: cn=Sheila Orms, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US DN: cn=Sheila Orms, o, ou, 5 Date: 2017.03.27 17:15:22 -04'00' 6 7 Sheila Orms 8 Certified Electronic Transcriber Digitally signed by Dawn South 9 Dawn South DN: cn=Dawn South, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2017.03.27 17:17:23 -04'00' 10 Dawn South 11 AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET\*\*D-408 12 13 Date: March 27, 2017 14 15 16 17 18 19 Veritext Legal Solutions 20 330 Old Country Road 21 Suite 300 22 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25